Representative bureaucracy and unconscious bias: Exploring the unconscious dimension of active representation by Akram, Sadiya
Akram, Sadiya (2017)Representative bureaucracy and unconscious bias:
Exploring the unconscious dimension of active representation. Public Ad-
ministration, 96 (1). pp. 119-133. ISSN 0033-3298
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/619465/
Version: Accepted Version
Publisher: Wiley
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12376
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
 1 
Representative Bureaucracy and Unconscious Bias: 
Exploring the Unconscious Dimension of Active Representation1 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Scholars of public administration have long been concerned with the representative aspects of 
bureaucracies (Kingsley, 1944; Pitkin 1967; Krislov, 1974; Mosher 1968/1982).2 Ever since 
Kingsley’s (1944) observation that the ‘middle-class state’ perpetuated its own values in 
administrations by recruiting only those who ‘have been educated according to the traditional 
pattern of the ruling class’ (1944, p.151), the representation of minorities in bureaucracies 
continues to be a pressing issue.   
 
Mosher’s (1968/1982) distinctions of active and passive representation have helped to further 
thinking on this issue. Whilst Kingsley was more concerned with the consequences of poor 
representation, and with social groups rather than individuals, Mosher focuses our attention on 
how individuals bring different ‘perspectives, knowledge, values, and abilities’ (1982: p.16) to 
bear on issues, leading him to identify two types of representation. Passive (or descriptive) 
representation ‘concerns the origin of individuals and the degree to which collectively, they 
mirror the whole of society’ (1982: p.15). Active representation, meanwhile, refers to when 
‘individuals (or administrators) are expected to press for the interests and desires of those 
whom they are presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or some segment of 
the people’ (1982: p.14). As evidence of the further refinement of these distinctions, there is 
now a growing literature on the relationship between passive and active representation 
(Andrews and Miller, 2013; Thompson, 1976; Saltzstein, 1979). This article contributes to this 
debate, focusing specifically on active representation and how it occurs.  
 
Kingsley is explicit about the fact that most of what is now called active representation was the 
result of in-group socialization. He contends:  
 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Dave Marsh, Kim Hutchings and Mike Kenny for comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also 
grateful to Meredith Edwards and Mark Evans at IGPA, University of Canberra, for fruitful discussions on 
unconscious bias during my time as a Research Fellow in Canberra. Thanks, finally, to the Public Administration 
reviewers for their helpful advice and suggestions.  
2 It should be noted that other notable discussions of representation exist, but which are not the focus here. 
Primary amongst these is Birch -  see Birch, A. (1964). Representative and Responsible Government. London: 
Allen and Unwin.  
 2 
And the Civil servants behaved in these fashions, not because they were taking orders 
from the representatives of the vested interests, but because they themselves thought in 
a similar manner. They were immersed in the ideologies of their class and they behaved 
accordingly (Kingsley, 1944: 291).  
 
Representation of class interests is, in Kingsley’s view, not a conscious or intentional process, 
but occurs at a subtler level, through socialisation. Similarly, Krislov and Rosenbloom (1981) 
argue that, even if we accept that bureaucrats are attempting to be socially representative, there 
is the issue of whether they will ‘retain values and attitudes stemming from their social 
backgrounds’, which constitutes a problem if the talent pool which is selected from is largely 
middle class (1981, p.23).3 This continues to be an issue, even when a bureaucracy may instil 
its own socialisation processes, so, whilst length of time working for an organisation matters, 
as does the ‘time-distance from one’s background’, as Mosher puts it: ‘(t)he fact is that we 
know too little about the relationship between a man’s background and pre-employment 
socialisation on the one hand, and his orientations and behaviour in the office on the other’ 
(Mosher, 1982: p.16). In short then, the extant literature on active representation suggests that 
much of it occurs through pre-employment socialisation and occurs outside of the awareness 
of the individual. Furthermore, as Mosher stated back in 1968 and again in 1982, how 
individuals bring ‘different perspectives, knowledge, values, and abilities’ to bear on issues 
(1982: p.16) has not been sufficiently explored by the literature and so represents a gap in our 
understanding of how active representation occurs.  
 
 
This article contributes to the representative bureaucracy literature by arguing that the 
dominant literature on representative bureaucracy does not reflect on the unconscious 
dimension of active representation. The path opened by Kingsley - “they were immersed in the 
ideologies of their class and they behaved accordingly” (1944, p.21) -  has not been sufficiently 
explored to date. The work of Atkins and Wilkins (2014); Andrews and Miller (2013); and 
Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006), for example, has expanded our understanding of the 
impact of active representation on public policy outcomes, but there is more we can learn about 
how active representation occurs. This article is concerned with how agents (actively) represent 
interests in bureaucracies. Unconscious bias, I argue, has a role to play in how we understand 
value transmission, decision-making and actions in the public sector and other bureaucracies. 
                                                 
3 See Stazyk et al. (2017) for a recent discussion of differences in values and the role of race. 
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To this end, this article combines a focus on representative bureaucracy theory with a 
discussion on unconscious bias, showing how the latter can enrich our understanding of how 
active representation occurs. The article discusses the finding of unconscious bias in the 
Australian Public Service (APS) (Edwards et al. 2014) to highlight how the concept helps to 
explain persistent gender inequality, but also to show the limitations of an under-theorised 
notion of unconscious bias. As a large public sector organisation, which is committed to, but 
has struggled to achieve gender equality to date, the APS case study has relevance beyond 
Australia and serves as a useful example of the challenges of understanding and tackling 
unconscious bias in public sector organisations. There has been a paucity of attention paid to 
unconscious bias in Public Administration, but the concept has the potential to enhance our 
understanding of how active representation occurs in bureaucracies.  
 
Unconscious Bias 
 
Research is beginning to point to the existence of unconscious bias, but the concept is poorly 
defined in the extant literature and/or is used un-problematically. So, for example, the existence 
of unconscious bias was identified by recent research into persistent gender inequality in the 
Australian Public Service (Australian Public Service Commission, 2012; Edwards et al. 2014; 
Evans and Edwards 2014; Evans et al. 2014). The concept is also used in the literature 
examining gender inequality in commercial organisations (Genat et.al 2012; Mckinsey & 
Company, 2011), while universities are providing ‘unconscious bias training’ for staff. Thus, 
there is an emerging consensus that unconscious bias exists, but the concept has received 
limited attention in Public Administration. However, that is not to say that the concept has not 
been documented in disciplines such as social and political psychology and behavioural 
psychology, which have long argued for the existence of ‘implicit bias’. Rather, I want to argue, 
that such literatures take a narrow approach to the concept based on either cognition, or the 
automacity of behaviour, and that we need to develop a conceptual understanding of the 
unconscious, which recognises its disputed status and considers what role this concept can have 
within a broader understanding of agency. Such a concept would have relevance to Public 
Administration scholars interested in representative bureaucracy, as well as wider appeal across 
the discipline.  
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Consequently, this article argues, firstly, that the unconscious represents a component of 
agency and, relatedly, that unconscious bias is a method through which bias is perpetuated in 
society. More specifically, I make two key claims: a) to understand unconscious bias, we must 
acknowledge that the unconscious is a contested concept and, therefore, develop a more 
adequate conceptual understanding of the unconscious; and b) we must pay greater attention 
to the concept of agency that underpins our understanding of unconscious bias, given the 
concept needs to be rooted in a broader discussion about agents, how they act and their role in 
reproducing inequality. Taking these two claims as my starting point, I develop a more 
adequate conceptualisation of the unconscious, which draws on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, 
as an element of a broader conceptualisation of agency.  This involves exploring the 
relationship between the unconscious and other capacities of agency, such as decision-making, 
reflexivity and habit and placing them on a spectrum where they interact.  
 
I acknowledge that conscious forms of bias exist, but contend that discrimination has evolved 
and that the focus should be on covert forms of bias as well as overt.  As such, our concepts 
also need to evolve. More specifically, in terms of public policy, I argue that an improved 
understanding of unconscious bias can significantly enhance how we understand 
discrimination, because it suggests a need to re-focus diversity agendas away from identifying 
‘bad’ people’, who make discriminatory decisions, to identifying well-intentioned people, who 
are unaware of the unconscious factors that affect their decision-making.  Such a proposition 
does not absolve individuals of personal responsibility for their discriminatory behaviour 
because it is unconscious, but, rather, highlights the need to regularly ‘check’ one’s biases.  
 
This article has four substantive sections. The first section provides context to this debate by 
exploring the literature on why representative bureaucracies matter. Next, I turn to the extant 
literature on unconscious bias, which is disparate given that it is in political and social 
psychology that the concept has been most utilised. Here, I begin by briefly considering 
research in private sector or commercial organisations, which has done most to document 
unconscious bias, although this work is un-theorised, merely identifying this form of bias.4 I 
subsequently consider the social/political psychology literature, which focuses on implicit 
biases, but offers a de-limited perspective because it is singularly concerned with cognition. In 
                                                 
4 It may be deemed unconventional to discuss this literature, but given that it includes recognition that 
unconscious bias exists, it is an important source of documentation.     
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the light of this narrow discussion of unconscious bias in various literatures, I then outline and 
discuss Bourdieu’s theory of habitus as a way of conceptualising the unconscious as an aspect 
of agency, before outlining a conceptual framework for better understanding unconscious bias.  
 
In the third section, I demonstrate the utility of my approach by considering recent research 
(Edwards et al., 2014) into the Australian Public Service (APS) which argues that unconscious 
bias is a key way in which gender inequality is reproduced in society; that ideas about gender 
of which people are, at least partly, unaware can affect their behaviour, and have replaced overt 
discrimination as the main cause of gender inequality in the APS.  Building on Edwards et al. 
(2014), my approach offers a fuller explanation of this process by theorising and elaborating 
on the concept of unconscious bias and linking it to an underpinning concept of agency. The 
final section of the article returns to the methodological implications of the concept of 
unconscious bias and the framework outlined. Here, I consider some of the methodological 
challenges in analysing unconscious bias, which requires new methods and techniques of 
inquiry. I conclude by returning to debates about bureaucratic representation with some 
tentative suggestions for ways forward for unconscious bias training programmes.  
 
 
1. Representative Bureaucracy Theory  
 
Research on representative bureaucracy theory has found that the level of diversity within an 
organization impacts on its ability to represent the public it serves (Riccucci and Van Ryzin, 
2016; Mosher, 1982; Skorkjaer, 2011; Sowa and Selden 2003; Pitkin 1967). The diversity 
literature also corroborates this (Linos et al. 2017; Stazyk et al. 2017; Skorkjaer, 2011; Pitts, 
2005). Research has also demonstrated that more representative bureaucracies tend to be better 
performing organizations with improved service delivery, particularly for unrepresented or 
minority groups (Wilkins, 2007; Meir and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). The issue is far from 
simple, and Christensen et al. (2017), for example, highlight the challenge of reconciling 
(geographic) representation with the recruitment of ‘specialized expertise’ in bureaucracies.   
 
Creating representative bureaucracies remains an ongoing challenge and applying a gender lens 
to bureaucracies offers some insight into the extent of the problem. The feminist analysis of 
bureaucracy stresses that, rather than being neutral, public organizations are in fact gendered. 
Specifically, they are characterized by hierarchical organization, a division of labour and 
technical rationality, meaning privileging task-orientated, rather than relational skills (Mackay 
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and Rhodes, 2013; Johnston 2017). A masculine culture of authority abounds, whilst femininity 
is associated with emotional and relational activities (Mackay and Rhodes, 2013). For example, 
Mackay and Rhodes (2013) analyse the everyday practices of femininity and masculinity and 
show how they shape gender norms in central government departments. They found that ‘rules, 
practices and beliefs’ reflect and reproduce unequal gender relations (2013: p.586). They also 
recognise that ‘daily practices of gender are often unthinking rather than purposive’ or are 
‘taken-for granted’ (2013: p.586). This hints at the need to move beyond the visible and explicit 
to understand institutional behavior and the mechanisms through which inequality is 
reproduced.  
 
If we accept that bias exists, and that it is reflected in stereotypes, norms, opinions and work-
place culture, we need a better understanding of whether it occurs through conscious or 
unconscious behavior; which should also inform our strategies to address it. This point is 
echoed by Johnston in her research on gendered patterns and biases within network 
governance. She argues that there is a need for ‘qualitative research into the unconscious 
mobilization of bias against women in collaborative governance’ (2017: p. 156). This is a 
worthy endeavour, but, before it can happen, we need greater clarity about what we mean by 
unconscious bias; the task of this paper.   
  
In the past women and minorities were kept out of the workplace by explicit rules and practices, 
today the discrimination is subtler. Consequently, there is a need to develop new conceptual 
tools to understand it. The first step in the analysis is to explore the extant and disparate 
literature on unconscious bias. The existence of unconscious bias as an obstacle to women’s 
career progression has been discussed particularly in the private sector (Genat et al., 2012; 
AIM, 2011; Mckinsey & Company, 2011; Ross, 2008) and grey literature (Australian 
Department of Defence, 2011; Australian Department of Treasury, 2011). There is also 
discussion of ‘implicit’ bias in the social and political psychology literature.5  This literature 
provides empirical evidence of unconscious/implicit bias, but, like the research into the APS 
                                                 
5 For social psychology literature which discusses implicit bias see:  Gaertner, S.L. and Dovidio, J.F.  (2005). 
Social Psychology Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism. Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 61 (3). 
Pp. 615-639. Also see: Payne, B.K., Gawronski, B., (2010). A history of implicit social cognition in Gawronski, 
B., Payne, B.K. (eds.), Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications. 
Guilford Press: New York. 
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discussed in Section 3 below, individuals are viewed as having unconscious capacities, but this 
is underdeveloped.   
 
 
i. Extant literature on unconscious bias  
 
It is the commercial and grey literature, which has done most to advance the concept of 
unconscious bias, highlighting organisations’ recognition that this is a pressing concern. Fig 1 
outlines the range of distinctions in that literature, which are a useful starting point for the 
discussion here. 
 
 
Form of unconscious bias  Nature of the problem Literature 
Gender evaluation bias Consistent or systematic devaluing of 
women relative to men 
Genat et al. 2012 
 
Gender backlash Stereotype bias in which women (or 
men) who behave counter-
stereotypically experience negative 
social or economic effects 
Genat et al. 2012 
Malestream understanding of 
leadership characteristics 
Perception that women’s leadership 
style (warm, friendly, less competitive) 
is not as valued as men’s (assertive, 
ambitious, decisive). 
Catalyst 2004 
Genat et al. 2012 
Perception that women 
prioritise family over work  
Perception of women as primary care-
givers; takers of maternity leave, which 
is perceived as disruptive and a choice 
to prioritize family over work. 
 
Sanders et al. 2011; 
McKinsey and 
Company, 2011.  
 
Fig 1.  Forms of unconscious bias  
 
Genat et al. (2012) identify two forms of unconscious bias: gender evaluation bias; and gender 
backlash. Gender evaluation bias involves a consistent, or systematic, devaluing of women 
relative to men in occupational settings. Gender backlash involves a form of stereotype bias in 
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which women (or men) who behave counter-stereotypically experience negative social or 
economic effects.  
 
Genat et al (2012) suggest that, when fully competent women aspire to leadership, which is 
often associated with stereotypically male characteristics, or to other male-dominated 
occupations, they experience a heavy, and hidden, handicap due to unconscious bias. 
Compared to their male peers, women are down-rated irrespective of whether they behave in 
stereotypically masculine or stereotypically feminine ways. In short, women are said to 
experience evaluation penalties regardless of whether they are good or bad at their job. 
Deepening the problem, backlash bias steps in when women attempt to act in a stereotypically 
male way. So, for example, if women self-promote like men, they become less likable, which 
may work against them.  This research highlights the paradox in which women in senior roles 
find themselves, namely that they are penalized for behaving in stereotypically male or female 
ways. 
 
The pervasive functioning of stereotypes relating to the typical characteristics of men and 
women, and to defining what makes a good leader, are central to understanding gender 
inequality and how the unconscious is implicated. Our understanding of men and women 
develops from a young age, and will, in later life, inform our evaluations of colleagues in the 
workplace. The private sector literature highlights the pervasive influence of stereotypes 
premised on traits that are typically expected of men, such as being ambitious, assertive, 
decisive and self-reliant (Genat et al. 2012; Catalyst 2004). These attributes are also associated 
with good leadership. Women, in contrast, are associated with being warm, sensitive, friendly 
or communal and less competitive in a male environment. Whilst these attributes are typically 
valued, they are deemed less important for most leadership roles than stereotypical male 
behaviour.  Ultimately, gender stereotypes misrepresent the true talents of women leaders and 
position women in an unfair and potentially no-win scenario.  
 
ii. Social and Political Psychology and ‘implicit’ bias 
 
Whilst the terminology differs, social psychology’s notion of implicit bias resembles the notion 
of unconscious bias discussed here. In social psychology, implicit bias is opposed to explicit 
bias, which reflects the attitudes or beliefs that one endorses at a conscious level. Implicit bias, 
then, is the bias in judgment and/or behaviour that results from cognitive processes (implicit 
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attitudes and implicit stereotypes) that operate at a level below conscious awareness and 
without intentional control. Ergo, implicit behaviour relies on cognitive processing and derives 
from automatic behaviour, rather than conscious intentional behaviour. Implicit bias relies on 
an associationist theory of memory, and the key insight here is that memory works in cascading 
fashion, so, as one mental construct is activated, it automatically - i.e. without intentionality -  
activates associated constructs. For example, exposure to a picture of fruit activates memory 
of apples.  Time of reaction is important and faster reactions imply greater mental association.  
 
Research in this area has indicated that implicit bias has implications for understanding 
attitudes toward members of socially-stigmatized groups, such as women and ethnic minorities.  
While controlled, or more conscious, processing is thought to be voluntary, automatic 
processing unfolds without attention and can be hard to suppress voluntarily (Greenwald and 
Banerji, 1995). Drawing on social psychology, the concept of implicit bias has also travelled 
to political psychology, with Galdi, Gawronski and Arcuri (2015), for example, arguing that 
implicit behaviours can help to understand political attitudes, behaviour and future political 
behaviour (also see Arcuri et al. [2008] and Burdein et al. [2006]). 
 
Social psychology’s understanding of implicit bias is premised on the fact that what a person 
says is not necessarily a good representation of all her feelings and thoughts, nor of how she 
will behave.  Using cognitive mapping, the central advance of research on implicit bias and 
social cognition is the apparent ability to measure people’s attitudes without having to ask them 
directly. This perspective has had some impact on diversity practices in the workplace and 
offers practical strategies for addressing bias.  For example, Implicit Association Tests (IAT) 
have now become a popular training tool in diversity programmes and are built around the 
principle of recognising biases, addressing where they come from and why they may be 
harmful.6  
 
As this discussion indicates, there is much support for the claim that inequality is reinforced 
through unconscious or implicit forms of bias. Whilst this body of work is important for 
documenting non-conscious forms of bias, it can only take us so far. Much of the commercial 
                                                 
6 Similarly, recent developments in the field of cognitive neuroscience demonstrate a link between implicit, but 
not explicit racial bias and neural activity in the amygdala; a region in the brain (Phelps et al. 2000; see also 
Stanley, Phelps and Banaji, 2008). The other notable recent research on unconscious bias is Bohnet’s (2016) work, 
which is informed by social psychology, behavioural science and neurobiology.   
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literature is atheoretical and operates with little, if any, discussion of what it means by the 
unconscious. Social and political psychology has an understanding of implicit bias, but this is 
based on the automatic processing of the brain and cognition, so, again, can only take us so far. 
In using the term ‘implicit’, as opposed to unconscious, social psychology limits its remit to 
cognition and the brain – and the automatic processes affecting the brain. The unconscious is 
not invoked in the concept of implicit bias; the focus is upon the brain and cognition. I suggest 
that, to understand unconscious bias, we must move beyond automatic cognition to theorise 
the unconscious and unconscious bias, within a broader understanding of agency. Such a 
perspective moves beyond a narrow focus on mental associations and reaction times that are 
central to social psychology’s understanding of implicit bias.  A further issue and a strength of 
the conception of unconscious bias developed here, is that it is important to move beyond a 
singular focus on unconscious bias, and consider instead how it interacts with other capacities 
of agency, particularly an individual’s capacity to reflect on her actions. In short, in the extant 
literature, discussion of unconscious bias often takes place in a vacuum and therefore makes 
little sense in terms of an overall understanding of agency, or how individuals understand how 
they, or others, act.   
 
2. Defining Agency  
 
A concept of agency underpins all conceptions of human behaviour, yet it is a neglected 
concept. The neglect of the unconscious aspect of agency reflects the focus in the social 
sciences on rational, reasoning and reflexive agents (Akram, 2012; Akram and Hogan, 2015).  
In response, I discuss Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus and its unconscious aspects. 
I argue that habitus has clear unconscious elements, although they were neglected in 
Bourdieu’s writing on the subject7 and that the concept can enhance our understanding of 
unconscious bias.  
 
 
i. Bourdieu and the unconscious habitus 
 
 
The 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history 
                                                 
7 An important clarification affects this discussion. For most readers, reference to a notion of the unconscious 
immediately raises the spectre of Freud (1927/1962) and psychoanalysis; approaches which have largely 
dominated discussion on this topic. The concept of the unconscious has a history in psychoanalysis, which is 
substantively different to the notion that is hinted at in Bourdieu's own writing, but also the notion advocated in 
this paper.  
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itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second 
nature of habitus…’ (1977: pp.78-79).
  
 
Offered as a more nuanced way to understand the relationship between structures and agents, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been much discussed, but its unconscious aspects have 
received less explicit attention. However, as the quote above makes clear, Bourdieu’s texts 
contain references to the ‘unconscious’, or to how actions are carried out ‘quasi-consciously’ 
(1977: p.76). I suggest habitus is premised on a complex relationship between the conscious 
and the unconscious and that, for Bourdieu, this is central to understanding how structure and 
agency interact – or how agents are affected by structure and, in turn, are implicated in how 
structure is reproduced. By extension, I propose that the unconscious habitus provides a useful 
framework for understanding unconscious bias, or how unconscious biases take root within 
habitus over the life course and may become deeply embedded and outside of the agent’s 
awareness. My aim in this section is to explore the concept of habitus and highlight how its 
functionality is, in fact, dependent upon it operating from a partially unconscious platform.  
 
Bourdieu claims that the individual's habitus is the product of her upbringing and, more 
particularly, of her class (1977: p.87). He explains that habitus brings about a: 'unique 
integration, dominated by earliest experiences... Thus, for example, the habitus acquired in the 
family underlies the structuring of school experiences..., and the habitus transformed by 
schooling itself diversified, in turn underlies the structuring of all subsequent experiences, and 
so on, from restructuring to restructuring' (1977: p.87). Bourdieu suggests that habitus should 
be a: 'subjective but not individual system of internalised structures common to all members of 
the same group or class' (1977: p.86). Habitus is a system of ‘dispositions’ which Bourdieu 
defines as ‘having a meaning close to that of words such as structure’ or ‘pre-disposition, 
tendency, propensity…’ (1977: 214 emphasis in the original). Habitus, then, provides a 
mechanism for understanding how social structure is reproduced and, in this way, both habitus 
and social structure are continually reconstituted. 
 
The unconscious elements of habitus are reflected in how it operates and they inform the 
agent’s 'practice' in a structured world. Agents do not always engage in an explicit way with 
the world’s rules or structures. The fact that they do engage with rules and structures on a 
regular basis requires a different principle of action, hence the unconscious. Habitus aims to 
locate the body in the social world and the social world in the body, so the social world is 
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experienced as embodied. Bourdieu describes the process of interaction between structures and 
agents in a very interesting way, using an analogy which sees the social world as 'the game', 
and the agent as the 'game player'. He presents habitus as the 'feel for the game', suggesting 
that, because of this sense of awareness or 'feel', 'the social game (is) embodied and turned into 
second nature' (1990a: p.63). Bourdieu goes on to suggest that the: 'good player does at every 
moment what the game requires. That presupposes a permanent capacity for invention, 
indispensable if one is able to adapt to indefinitely varied and never completely identical 
situations' (1990a: p.63).  
My broader argument here is that habitus provides a useful way of conceptualising unconscious 
bias. Essentially, habitus can structure how agents think about gender, and indeed other aspects 
of their lives. The unconscious habitus provides a mechanism to understand how agents 
internalize thoughts about gender roles, about responsibility for child-care and about leadership 
styles, as ‘durable, transposable dispositions’ (Bourdieu, 1977). Important here is the point that 
has been acknowledged by the existing literature on unconscious bias discussed earlier, that 
these perceptions develop over the course of a lifetime, and may begin to be reinforced as 
gender stereotypes from childhood.  
A notion of the unconscious as a component of agency is also central for understanding how 
structure affects agency and, in turn, how structure is reproduced. A concept of the unconscious 
aids our understanding of social structure in two ways. First, it helps to explain how agents are 
affected by social structures such as gender independent of their awareness of it. Second, this 
unconscious engagement with social structure helps to explain how gender is reproduced as a 
social structure. Influencing agency through the unconscious is not the only way in which 
gender impacts on agency, nor is the unconscious alone responsible for reproducing gender as 
a social structure in society. However, this account complements our understanding of more 
explicit and conscious methods through which gender impacts on society and, therefore, 
enhances our understanding of the interaction between structure and agency.  
 
At this stage, it would be reasonable to question the role of conscious action in the habitus. 
Does an emphasis on unconscious action mean that habitus cannot be a site of conscious and 
reflexive behaviour? Bourdieu’s critics have argued that the presence of the unconscious in 
habitus affects or reduces conscious actions and thoughts (Elder-Vass 2007; Jenkins 2002). 
The same authors have, to various degrees, also argued that habitus is an overly determinist 
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concept, although Bourdieu would disagree. However, I would argue that stating that agents 
act in an unconscious and habitual way in terms of everyday structural interaction is not the 
same as arguing that agents have no conscious and reflexive capabilities, rather it is to argue 
that structural and agential interaction often occurs in a mundane and habitual manner.   
 
ii. Exploring the interplay between unconscious and other agential capacities 
It is worth expanding on the relationship between the unconscious and conscious and other 
aspects of agency to show their interplay, whilst also producing a more complex understanding 
of agency. Here, I focus on the interplay between the unconscious and reflexivity, decision-
making and habit in the habitus. This is particularly important for recognising how, for 
example, well-intentioned people can also engage in unconscious bias, without necessarily 
realising it.  
a) Reflexivity  
Reflexivity is defined as ‘the (agents) regular exercise of the mental ability… to consider 
themselves in relation to their social contexts and vice versa’ (Archer, 2012. p.1). Accepting 
the unconscious as a component of agency does not negate the fact that agents have reflexive 
capabilities, but underlines the point that the unconscious also affects reflexivity, because some 
biases are deeply ingrained within us.  Habitus, of course, can be a site of conscious reflexivity 
about gender roles. Individuals are often reflexive about gender, as well as other things of 
concern to their lives.  Rather, what I am arguing, contra Archer (2012), is that agents are not 
routinely reflexive, nor is it their dominant mode of behavior, but, instead, agents often act 
habitually, in a non-reflexive, unconscious, way (Akram and Hogan, 2015). This is how habitus 
works.  Agents have values and orientations on which they reflect, but they also have some 
that do not reflect on; so, these values are unconscious.   
Bourdieu has often been criticised for neglecting reflexivity in habitus (Archer, 2012; Jenkins 
2000, Elder-Vass 2007). The response to this, which I would endorse, has been that reflexivity 
operates in relation to habitus and not outside of it (McNay, 1999). Moreover, as McNay argues 
(1999), reflexivity, or enacting change in one’s life, is often difficult, and does not occur in a 
vacuum uninfluenced either by other characteristics of agency, or by social structure.  
b) Decision-Making  
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When interviewing candidates for a position, or for a promotion, it is reasonable to expect that 
those in charge of the process would engage in a process of considered and deliberate reflection 
about the various merits of candidates before deciding. This process often assumes that 
decision-making takes places in a vacuum, based on rational reasoning and judgment.  One 
shortcoming of the existing research in this area is that it does not account for the potential 
influence of unconscious processes on decision-making and conscious reasoning. In his 
research into this issue, Singh (2005) found that his participants made decisions (on policy 
issues and personal preferences) quickly with little external evidence to support them, even 
though many reported having little, or no, knowledge relating to the decision. Singh argues that 
people have little or no awareness of their actual decision-making processes, so they are not 
aware of the actual reasons for their decisions or actions. This is the case even when/if they 
can give reasons when prompted to do so (post-hoc reasoning). These findings do not support 
traditional, purely conscious, models of judgment and decision-making. Instead, they point to 
the importance of the interactive nature of various agential characteristics and to the impact of 
the unconscious on the more conscious capacities of agency. 
c) Habit  
Habit is also important for understanding how unconscious bias develops. Habit, however, has 
been neglected in more recent social theory partly because of the use of the term in behavioural 
psychology, where it is often interpreted as a biological reflex. Another reason for its declining 
importance is that it is antithetical to a notion of reflexivity. In Archer’s view, agents today are 
becoming increasingly reflexive in their lives and this reduces their reliance on habit (Archer, 
2012). 
Bourdieu, however, recognises the importance of habit to agency, arguing that it plays an 
important role in habitus. Swartz suggests that habitus implies a ‘force of habit’, which drives 
behaviour, without determining it (Swartz, 2002, p.665). As Bourdieu himself insists, agency 
is much more than just habits, as this would mean that agents would have little power to engage 
in conscious and deliberate action. Much like practices which enter the unconscious, habits 
may be encountered consciously or unconsciously, and, thus, reflect the importance of 
intentional and conscious actions. Further, conceivably, there may be a relationship between 
the unconscious and habit. It should also be emphasised that habits can be broken or interrupted 
through conscious actions, which is the main thrust of Ross’ (2008) techniques for tackling 
unconscious bias.   
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iii. Spectrum of Characteristics in Agency 
Central to my argument for the unconscious habitus, is the need to conceptualise agency as a 
spectrum. The spectrum would include conscious behaviour, habit, reflexivity, decision-
making and the unconscious; all discussed here.  This list is not exhaustive; a task beyond the 
scope of this article. The aim of a creating a spectrum is to emphasise the range of factors that 
construct agency, and how they interact. One principle of agency may dominate in one 
scenario, whilst others exist in the background.  
The unconscious is important for agency, because it reflects the principle that the socio–
political world affects agents in ways which they cannot necessarily control, and that we may 
behave in ways of which we are not necessarily conscious, hence unconscious bias.  In addition, 
the unconscious provides a way of understanding how social structure, or gender, can affect 
agents in a way of which they are unaware. As such, the unconscious is critical for thinking 
about the relationship between agents and structures.  
In the next section, I discuss research into the Australian Public Service (Edwards et al. 2014) 
and its finding of unconscious bias, with the aim of showing that the concept of unconscious 
bias utilized is under-defined and the framework discussed here offering the potential to deepen 
our understanding. In the absence of the author’s own data, I have selected this case study 
because it is one of the few recent academic studies into unconscious bias in a large (public 
sector) organisation. There is a paucity of literature on unconscious bias in Public 
Administration and so this study serves as a valuable illustrative example through which to 
develop insights into unconscious bias although, as is discussed below, it is not without its 
problems.   
 
 
3.  Case Study of the Australian Public Service (APS) 
 
‘Not yet 50/50’8 (Edwards et al., 2014) is a report exploring barriers to the progress of senior 
women in the APS (see also Evans et al. 2014 and Evans and Edwards 2014). In June 2012, 
women made up 57% of the APS workforce, but only 40% of the senior executives (SES) were 
women (APSC9 2012: 148). In all but four departments, women outnumbered men, but, in 
                                                 
8 The author of this paper was not a member of the team who researched and wrote the ‘Not Yet 50/50’ report, 
but was involved in formative discussions relating to the research during my time as a Research Fellow at the 
University of Canberra.  
9 The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) is a statutory agency of the Australian Government. 
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contrast, only four out of 19 departments had more women than men at the SES level. There 
was also considerable variation between the representation of women at different SES levels; 
so, 37% of Band 2 positions (equivalent to head of division) were held by women, but only 
28% of Band 3 positions (the most senior rank of management below the Secretary/head level) 
(APSC 2012: 150). Only 20% of departments were headed by women. There were also clear 
differences across Departments and Agencies, with Education, Human Services and Health 
being traditionally well-represented (APSC 2012).10  
Starting from the premise that the barriers to women’s progression are undisputed in the wider 
literature, so, for example, perceived differences in leadership styles or a male-stream work-
place culture, the authors’ key finding is that the nature of these barriers are misunderstood – 
i.e. whether they are conscious or unconscious. The report emphasises the existence and 
unconscious mobilisation of bias against women in the workplace. It argues that this is reflected 
in dominant norms and values that advantage men with requisite skills, which are valued and 
recognised, while, at the same time, disadvantaging women, such that they are passed over 
when it comes to promotion.   
Based on their findings, the authors identify four propositions about the under-representation 
of women in leadership positions in the APS:  
Proposition 1: competing priorities/family responsibilities hinder women from taking 
up demanding leadership roles. 
Proposition 2: negative male perceptions of a woman's ability to lead impede women's 
progression into leadership roles 
Proposition 3: workplace structures and cultures hamper women's progress by 
distilling processes of unconscious bias that afford comparative advantage to men with 
the requisite attributes. 
Proposition 4: workplace cultures and practices undermine the self-confidence and 
self-belief of women in seeking career advancement.  
                                                 
10 To ensure a broadly representative sample, the authors develop a typology of six Commonwealth Departments 
based on whether Departments/Agencies were more likely to have a male-streamed culture (Agencies with fewer 
than 40% of women in their SES); Departments/Agencies more likely to possess reasonable representation of 
women at the senior levels of the SES (Agencies with more than 40% of women at the senior levels of the SES; 
and Departments/Agencies likely to have embedded norms and values due to longstanding history. 
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                                                                                        (Edwards et al., 2014)  
Propositions 1 and 2 above refer directly to negative perceptions about women’s competency 
in the workplace.  The research found that men, overwhelmingly, consider ‘commitment to 
family responsibilities’ as the most important factor impacting on women's career prospects. 
Senior women agree that family responsibilities are an important barrier, but not to the 
exclusion of others. For example, over half of SES men and women in male-streamed 
Departments identified ‘career breaks’ as a crucial factor, which seems to indicate less 
tolerance in those Departments for career interruptions. Of course, this may relate to other 
barriers, such as a lack of visibility, exclusion from networks, male stereotyping and an 
inhospitable culture. 
Proposition 4 deserves further attention, because it suggests that unconscious bias has an 
especially insidious effect by impacting on women’s confidence and self-belief, thereby acting 
as an impediment to their progress. Many reasons are advanced by both men and women to 
explain this; they relate to, and result from, the cultural and organizational systems which 
reinforce messages about women's place or ‘lack of fit’ in leadership positions. Narratives from 
the study indicate that women apply high standards when assessing whether they can do the 
job and often express reluctance to promote themselves, whereas a very common response was 
that men will apply, even if they do not feel ready. This finding suggests that women often 
undervalue their capability and expertise, which can be explained by an organizational culture 
which conveys the message that women are not quite as good as their male colleagues. 
Proposition 3 underpins all the others as it points specifically to unconscious bias as the 
mechanism which impedes women's progress by ‘distilling processes of unconscious bias that 
afford comparative advantage to men with the requisite attributes’ (Edwards et al., 2014, p.12). 
As this report acknowledges, the concept of unconscious bias has received little to no academic 
attention and the authors suggest their project is one of the first empirical studies into this issue. 
This is clearly an important piece of research, however, whilst it adds much to our 
understanding of how gender inequality operates in the workplace, it contains several gaps. 
Specifically, the project fails to conceptualise unconscious bias, or the unconscious, with no 
discussion of agency and behaviour; a point acknowledged by two of the authors in a separate 
piece (Evans and Edwards 2014).  
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i.  Reconsidering the case study in light of the framework    
 
The ‘Not yet 50/50’ report is limited by its under-theorised understanding of unconscious bias. 
So, agents are assumed to have unconscious capacities, or indeed the capacity to engage in 
unconscious bias, but there is little discussion of agency.  In Section 2, I outlined a conceptual 
frame for understanding the unconscious, and how this might be understood within a broader 
conception of agency. In this section, I want to draw out the lessons of this conceptual frame 
for the ‘Not Yet 50/50’ report.  
 
In documenting the perceptions of men and women at various levels of seniority in the 
Australian Public Service (APS), Edwards et al. (2014) conclude that men overwhelmingly 
consider ‘commitment to family responsibilities’ as the most important factor impacting on 
women's career prospects (see proposition 1 noted earlier). Certainly, Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus provides a conceptual frame for understanding how perceptions about gender roles, 
such as prioritizing family over other commitments, becomes internalized as a part of the 
agent’s habitus. Remember, habitus here refers to our outlook upon the world, incorporating 
mental dispositions thus it can provide a frame through which to understand how active 
representation occurs in bureaucracies. Further, because we know that habitus operates at a 
partially unconscious level, such norms and values will influence behaviour, even, for example, 
when individuals think that they are acting impartially and reflexively in an interview situation. 
It is precisely because of the overlap between decision-making, reflexivity and the 
unconscious, that we have a better understanding of how these factors intertwine to affect 
judgment and behaviour. In sum, a more nuanced understanding of how values and dispositions 
are internalised over time in habitus aids our understanding of how active representation occurs 
on an everyday basis to reproduce inequality and discrimination.  
 
The obstacles to women’s progress in the workplace cannot all be attributed to unconscious 
bias originating from men. Edwards’ et al.’s (2014) research also found that SES and EL 
women report low self-confidence and self-belief, which acts as an impediment to their career 
progression (see proposition 4 above). This may result from the cultural and organizational 
systems, which reinforce messages about women's place, or ‘lack of fit’, in leadership 
positions.    
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Women reporting low self-confidence and self-belief is a clear case where habitus and the 
unconscious can help us to better understand how such views take root and are internalized. 
Habitus allows us to understand how gender stereotyping impact on individuals over the life 
course. Women, like men, are socialised into gender roles from an early age and, in the case of 
women, this may, through structural gender discrimination, lead to the inculcation of feelings 
of self-doubt in relation to various fields, including the workplace. Such feelings may impact 
on one’s workplace behaviour at an unconscious or conscious level, or as a mixture of both. 
As Bourdieu argues, we each carry in ourselves: ‘part of yesterday’s man... who inevitably 
predominates in us, since the present amounts to little compared to the long past’ (1977, p.79).     
 
As we have seen, unconscious bias as discussed by Edwards et al. (2014) and the extant 
literature is clearly a term which relates to agency. As such, it is important to think critically, 
conceptually and in-depth about the concept of agency which underpins it.  
 
4. A Future Research Agenda  
 
Ross’ Implicit Association Test (2008) discussed earlier, based on social psychology’s theory 
of associationalism, provides the dominant approach to unconscious bias training programmes 
today.  Given the alternative understanding of unconscious bias developed in this article, I 
argue that attempts to address unconscious bias would benefit from a theorization of the 
unconscious as formulated in this piece, and related, a methodology drawing on this theoretical 
frame. Such an approach takes account of the deep underlying structures that shape prejudices, 
and how they take root over the life course in habitus.   
 
In this section I address the methodological implications of the concept of unconscious bias 
and the framework outlined here. I consider some of the methodological challenges in 
researching unconscious bias which will require new methods and techniques of inquiry.  Space 
limitations prevent a detailed exposition of the methodology, here I highlight key principles.   
 
Almost the foundational principle of any social science methodology is to focus upon the 
visible; whether through documenting the spoken word or the movements of the human body, 
by the interviewer, the ethnographer or the participant observer. Whilst these issues are 
certainly worthy of the social scientist’s attention, this article seeks to draw attention to those 
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aspects of behaviour, which are hidden, elusive and transient; that exist at the level of the 
unconscious, and which inform unconscious bias.  
 
The starting point of the unconscious bias methodology involves documenting the agent’s 
habitus and its unconscious elements, allowing insight into the individual’s unconscious biases. 
I advocate an approach to habitus in which the researcher attempts to access both the habitus 
and its unconscious elements through sensitively accessing and revealing layers of habitus 
using a range of qualitative methodological tools. As such, the outermost layer of habitus is 
conceptualised as being more accessible than the layers at the core, paralleling the progression 
from conscious, reflexive and intentional understandings to those which operate at the level of 
the unconscious.   
 
The first layer of habitus can be accessed using direct, qualitative and in-depth questions, 
utilising what is usually termed a life-history approach This provides an initial picture of the 
habitus.  Second, one can delve further into habitus by building on the information provided at 
the first level and using it to construct hypothetical scenarios in interviews with respondents. 
So, one could locate the individual within these scenarios and ask them how they would react. 
For example, we might ask individuals how they would respond to a female leader; to 
colleagues taking maternity leaves or on changes to the gender balance of their office. Finally, 
for the deepest level of the habitus, the level that it most difficult to penetrate, language analysis 
or critical discourse analysis could be used. The focus here would be on picking up on the hints 
or subtle points made during the interview. That which is unsaid, the silences, and that which 
might be termed non-verbal communication. Together these three strategies could be combined 
to allow greater knowledge and understanding of an individual's habitus.  
 
I do not have the space to expand further, but the methodology advocated here draws insights 
from a range of methodological approaches, including conversational analysis, discourse-
analytical approaches and interpretive methodologies. At the core of this methodology is a 
reliance on an in-depth interview method which uses both structured and unstructured 
questions in a sensitive way to encourage the interviewee to open-up and to be comfortable 
and communicative in a non-threatening interview environment. Central to this approach must 
be a concerted effort to document bodily hexis (Bourdieu, 1977) in the interview. So, for 
example, if the interviewee is being defensive in her body language this should also be 
documented as part of the interview.  
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The unconscious by its very nature will be difficult to capture. The methodology developed 
here may not give us immediate access to unconscious biases or a complete picture of the 
unconscious aspects of the habitus, but it will help to capture some sense of the habitus and its 
unconscious dimension. Time and detailed qualitative engagement with interviewees is 
paramount to this methodology.  
 
In Conclusion  
 
 
As Kingsley stated in 1944, ‘(B)ureaucracies, to be democratic, must be representative of the 
groups they serve’ (1944: p. 305).  Building on Kingsley’s (1944) criticisms of the narrow 
outlook, values and culture of the British Civil Service, subsequent research on representative 
bureaucracy has furthered our understanding of types of representation, but conspicuously 
absent in the debate thus far is engagement with concepts of agency and specifically with the 
unconscious – and the role it plays in understanding how representation occurs at the level of 
the individual. Addressing this gap, this article has furthered our understanding of how 
bureaucratic representation occurs, showing how unconscious bias and the unconscious more 
broadly offers a route through which agents transmit values, culture and biases through active 
representation, thus enhancing our understanding of what Kingsley and others understood as 
the influence of pre-employment socialisation on representation in bureaucracies.  
 
This article, in its discussion of agency, develops a conceptual vocabulary to enhance our 
understanding of how active representation occurs. I develop an approach to the unconscious 
within a broader notion of habitus as a conceptual frame within which to understand how 
unconscious bias operates and is implicated in reproducing discrimination. The article also 
outlines a methodological frame for thinking about how to document unconscious bias based 
around Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. A renewed focus on what we mean by agency and its key 
capacities will provide Public Administration scholars with a much firmer platform from which 
to understand and tackle unconscious bias in bureaucracies. 
 
Whilst some progress has been made in tackling the myriad forms of inequality that exist in 
society, it is clear from the ‘Not yet 50/50’ report, as well as other research discussed here, that 
discrimination continues to be a significant issue. To address this problem, it is important to 
recognise that discrimination can take multiple forms. Just as overt discrimination declined 
 22 
through better policing, there is a need to renew efforts to address unconscious bias. One of the 
aims of this article has been to show that discrimination has become harder to document and 
track. Crucially, individuals may not even know that they are engaging in discriminatory 
practices. Gender discrimination in bureaucracies today may, of course, still operate at an 
explicit and conscious level, but it also functions at a subtler level, and we need better tools 
and concepts to understand it.  The discussion of unconscious gender bias here serves as an 
illustration of an issue that may extend to other forms of discrimination, such as race, class and 
disability. As such, the concept of unconscious bias discussed here has relevance beyond a 
focus on gender.   
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